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"YOU GET THE HOUSE. I GET THE CAR. YOU GET THE
KIDS. I GET THEIR SOULS." THE IMPACT OF
SPIRITUAL CUSTODY AWARDS ON THE FREE
EXERCISE RIGHTS OF CUSTODIAL PARENTS
JORDAN C. PAULI-
Interfaith marriages' have increased at a tremendous rate over
the past thirty years.2 Simultaneous with this increase has been a
rapid increase in the American divorce rate.3 Because religion sits at
the core of many basic attitudes and values, one predictable conse-
quence of this contemporaneous rise in the rates of interfaith mar-
riage and divorce has been an increasing number of disputes over
the religious upbringing of children who fall victim to the divorce of
an interfaith couple.4 As a result, increased attention has been
focused on the concept of "spiritual custody."
t B.S. 1983, J.D. Candidate 1990, University of Pennsylvania. I would like to
thank I. Edward Huttner of Huttner, Huttner & Rappaport, P.C., Denver, Colorado,
for his assistance in providing transcripts and other documents.
I Interfaith or "mixed" marriages are those between persons of different
religions. The cases focused upon in this Comment deal with marriages between
Jews and Christians as well as conflicts that arise when spouses are members of
different Christian faiths or practice different forms ofJudaism. See infra notes 63-65
and accompanying text.
2 Current studies estimate that up to 40% of Jewish people currently marry
outside of their faith as opposed to approximately 6% during the 1950s. See J.
PETSONK & J. REMSEN, THE INTERMARRIAGE HANDBOOK 9, 381 n.l (1988); Johnson,
Struggle For Custody Of Children's Faith Becomes Nightmare, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1988, at
Al, col. 1, A48, col. 3 [hereinafter Struggle For Custody]. The number of Catholics who
choose to marry persons of other religions has also increased dramatically, moving
from an estimated 20% in the mid-fifties to nearly 50% in 1986. See Maloney, Behind
Rise In Mixed Marriages, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 10, 1986, at 70.
3 It is now estimated that over fifty percent of all marriages will end in divorce.
See Martin & Bumpass, Recent Trends in Marital Disruption, DEMOGRAPHY, Feb. 1989, at
37, 37.
4 The divorce rate forJewish-Christian couples has been estimated at nearly six
times the rate forJewish-jewish couples and nearly twice the overall U.S. rate. Seej.
PETsONK &J. REMSEN, supra note 2, at 399 n.1; see also Schwarzman v. Schwarzman, 88
Misc. 2d 866, 872, 388 N.Y.S.2d 993, 997 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) ("When one of these
differences [in the marriage] is religious, experience teaches us that there is a greater
potential for destruction of the marriage than for most other factors."); Annotation,
Constitutional Pinciples Applicable to Award or Modification of Custody of Child - Supreme
Court Cases, 80 L.Ed.2d 886, 888 (1986) ("The notorious bitterness and ruthlessness
displayed by the contending parties in child custody disputes stem, in part, from the
fact that such cases directly affect some of the values and relationships which we hold
most dear .... ").
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Spiritual custody awards occur when judges, utilizing the broad
discretion offered by the "best interests of the child" standard,'
grant physical custody of a child to one parent, but determine that
the child's best interests will be served if she is raised in the noncus-
todial parent's religion.6 The court thus prohibits the custodial par-
ent from passing her religion on to her child. The spiritual custody
concept was recently invoked in the case of Simms v. Simms 7 in Den-
ver, Colorado. In Simms, the judge awarded "spiritual custody" of
two children, aged four and six, to theirJewish father despite the fact
that physical custody would remain with the girls' Roman Catholic
mother and her new husband.' The court noted that the children
had been "raised consistently until the separation . . .as Jews and
that it has caused them a certain amount of unhappiness and confu-
sion when they were required to attend Catholic services . . .with
their mother .... -9 The court decided that the "children would be
emotionally harmed by an attempt to raise them in both religions."
10
Thus, the court ruled that although physical custody would be
granted to the Catholic mother, it would be "in the best interests of
the[ ] two children to be raised in the Jewish faith, and the only way
that's going to be accomplished is for the court to grant [the father]
custody for the purposes of determining religious training.''
I
Due to the rapid increase in interfaith marriages, the Simms case
has received nationwide attention.' 2 Although the award was unu-
5 Every state has accepted the idea that child custody awards are to be made in a
manner that promotes the best interests of the child. This standard leaves judges
with a great deal of discretion to structure child custody awards in whatever fashion
they feel is appropriate. See infra notes 76-90 and accompanying text.
6 Throughout this Comment, the terms custodial parent and noncustodial
parent are used. The term custodial parent refers to the parent who receives primary
physical custody of the child; in other words, the parent the child lives with the
majority of the time. The other parent is referred to as the noncustodial parent.
7 No. 87DR3301 (Dist. Ct., Denver County, Colo. Dec. 29, 1987). The Simms
decision has been appealed.
8 Id. slip op. at 11.
9 Id. slip op. at 10.
10 Id. slip op. at 11.
I I Id. The court in Simms did not specify the details of the religious custody
award: it did not delineate the rights of the father nor the limits on the mother.
Nevertheless, in November 1988, Mrs. Boeke (the former Mrs. Simms) was found to
be in contempt of court for taking the children to daily Mass and was issued a ten-day
suspended jail term. See Struggle for Custody, supra note 2, at A48, col. 4.
12 The Simms case has received front page coverage in The New York Times, see
Struggle For Custody, supra note 2, and was presented to national television audiences
as a feature story on Nightline, see Nightline, (ABC television broadcast, December 29,
1988); The Phil Donahue Show, see The Phil Donahue Show: Bizarre Custody Cases
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sual, it was not unprecedented."3 The broad judicial discretion
afforded by the best interests standard combined with basic societal
changes' 4 has led to a more flexible judicial approach to child cus-
tody questions. Thisjudicial flexibility raises the possibility that spir-
itual custody awards may occur more frequently in the years to come.
Numerous constitutional issues arise in a spiritual custody
award.' 5 This Comment analyzes the first amendment free exercise
(Multimedia Entertainment television broadcast, Jan. 3, 1989); and The Reporters. See
The Reporters, (Fox television broadcast, Jan. 7, 1989).
13 See, e.g., Vazquez v. Vazquez, 443 So. 2d 313, 314 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(finding that trial court acted within its discretion when it awarded custody of
children to Baptist mother but ordered mother to keep children in Catholic schools);
Stern v. Stern, 40 Il1. App. 2d 374, 378, 382-84, 188 N.E.2d 97, 98, 100-01 (1963)
(upholding an order directing a minor child to be raised in the Jewish faith despite
the fact that custody was awarded to his Lutheran mother); Gottlieb v. Gottlieb, 31
Ill. App. 2d 120, 121-26, 135-37, 175 N.E.2d 619, 621-22, 626-27 (1961) (holding
that an agreement between divorcing parties to raise their children in the Jewish faith
could not be modified by custodial parent to permit a child to enroll in Catholic
school); Spring v. Glawon, 89 A.D.2d 980, 981, 454 N.Y.S.2d 140, 141-42 (1982)
(denying mother the right to enroll her children in parochial schools following a
motion by their Jewish father); Grayman v. Hession, 84 A.D.2d 111, 112, 446
N.Y.S.2d 505, 506 (1961) (holding that a mother violated a divorce decree by not
bringing up child in the orthodoxJewish faith); Gluckstern v. Gluckstern, 31 Misc. 2d
58, 59, 220 N.Y.S.2d 623, 623-24 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961) (supporting an antenuptial
agreement which stipulated that a child will be brought "up in the OrthodoxJewish
faith," despite objections of a custodial Christian Scientist mother).
14 Society's changing perceptions about traditional male/female roles has
resulted in an increased recognition of the rights of fathers. In an effort to recognize
and expand the parental role for all parties, joint and shared custody awards have
become increasingly common. See infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
15 Spiritual custody awards have an impact upon the constitutional rights of
both custodial and non-custodial parents as well as the children themselves. While
this Comment focuses on the free exercise rights of custodial parents, spiritual
custody awards also raise issues of religious establishment, freedom of speech,
freedom of association, and family privacy due to the state mandated restrictions on
parental rights to communicate their religious beliefs to their child.
Although this Comment focuses on the free exercise aspects of spiritual custody
awards, an argument can also be made that these awards violate the three pronged
establishment clause test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Under the three part Lemon test, which has been accepted as the standard for
evaluating establishment clause claims, governmental action constitutes an
establishment of religion unless it can be shown that:
1) The action has a secular purpose;
2) The principal or primary effect of the action neither advances nor
inhibits religion; and
3) The action "[does] not foster 'an excessive government entanglement
with religion.' "
Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
By choosing a religion for the child and interfering with the custodial parent's
choices for the child's day to day activities, spiritual custody awards arguably violate
all three prongs of the Lemon test. Cf Zucco v. Garrett, 150 Ill. App. 3d 146, 156, 501
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implications of the spiritual custody concept. It argues that the con-
cerns justifying state intervention into family life and religion under
the guise of the child's best interests are satisfied when a physical
custodian is selected for the child. Therefore, absent a specific show-
ing of physical or demonstrable psychological harm to a child, spiri-
tual custody awards that infringe upon the free exercise rights of the
custodial parent fail to satisfy the strict scrutiny test governing such
state action. The Comment begins by examining the free exercise
clause and the standards of review used by the Supreme Court when
violations are alleged. In doing so, it identifies characteristics that
are common to situations in which the Court has found "compelling
needs" sufficient to justify free exercise infringement. Part II turns
to family law and demonstrates how the best interests doctrine has
been used to justify spiritual custody awards. Part III applies the
Supreme Court's free exercise review standards to the spiritual cus-
tody context. It argues that the nebulous best interests standard is
too broad to qualify as a compelling need that would justify infringe-
ment of a custodial parent's free exercise rights. The Comment con-
cludes by identifying specific underlying goals of the best interests
standard, and offers an analytical framework that would limit judicial
discretion when spiritual custody issues arise.
I. THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
Freedom of religion is among the most sacred of American con-
stitutional protections. As Justice Jackson once noted, "[i]f there is
any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein."' 6 The importance of this
principle can be traced directly to the United States' historical roots
as a country founded by refugees fleeing religious persecution.' 7
N.E.2d 875, 881 (1986) (holding that the first and second prongs of the Lemon test
were violated when lower court considered fact that father regularly attended church
and mother did not in reaching its custody decision).
For a detailed analysis of the establishment clause issues that may arise in child
custody cases, see generally Note, The Establishment Clause and Religion in Child Custody
Disputes: Factoring Religion into the Best Interest Equation, 82 MIcH. L. REv. 1702 (1984)
(arguing that to avoid establishment clause violations, courts should only consider
religion in custody disputes if the child has personal religious convictions).
16 Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
17 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-15 (1947) (discussing history of
religious persecution in Europe and the American colonies and the desires of the
founding fathers to prevent religious oppression).
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The significance placed by the founding fathers on religious freedom
as an underlying American philosophical tenet is articulated in the
first amendment, the first sentence of which provides that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohib-
iting the free exercise thereof . . 1,8 This principle has been
extended to the states via the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, 19 and encompasses both legislative and judicial
action.
20
The section of the first amendment dealing with religious free-
dom consists of two separate and distinct clauses: the establishment
clause and the free exercise clause.2" Separate bodies of law have
developed around each clause. 22 Section A examines the analytical
framework employed by the Supreme Court in free exercise cases.
Section B identifies common characteristics of state objectives that
the Court has found sufficiently compelling to justify infringement of
18 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
19 See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 139-40
(1987) (holding that Florida's denial of unemployment compensation benefits to an
employee discharged because of her refusal to work certain hours for religious
reasons "violate[d] the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, applicable to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment"); Everson, 330 U.S. at 17 (holding
that a New Jersey township board of education could authorize reimbursement of
funds expended by parents in busing their children to religious and other private
schools); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) ("The fundamental
concept of liberty embodied in [the fourteenth] amendment embraces the liberties
guaranteed by the first amendment."). But see R.A. Goldwin & A. Kaufman, Preface to
How DoEs THE CONsTrruTrON PROTECT RELIGIOUS FREEDOM? at xiv (R.A. Goldwin &
A. Kaufman eds. 1987) (noting that some scholars have questioned whether the
authors of the fourteenth amendment intended it to be utilized to apply the first
amendment to the states).
20 See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958) ("It is not of moment
that the State has. .. acted solely through its judicial branch, for whether legislative
or judicial, it is still the application of state power which we are asked to scrutinize.")
21 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
22 A recurring problem in constitutional law is the inherent tension between the
two religion clauses. Decisions which inhibit state action as violative of the
establishment clause (school prayer prohibitions for example) may impact negatively
upon an individual's ability to practice their religion. At the same time,
governmental action designed to allow individuals to pursue their religious beliefs
(expending government funds for military chaplains) could be construed as state
sponsorship of religion. See 'Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 719 (1980)
(acknowledging the existence of a "tension between the two Religion Clauses");
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 309 (1963) ("[T]here are areas in
which a doctrinaire reading of the Establishment Clause leads to irreconcilable
conflict with the Free Exercise Clause."). But see Baker, Jr., The Religion Clauses
Reconsidered: the Jaffree Case, in THE ASSAULT ON RELIGION: COMMENTARIES ON THE
DECLINE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 38-39 (R. Kirk ed. 1986) (arguing that the Supreme
Court has created the tension by applying separate criteria for analysis of the two
clauses).
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these rights. This analysis will enable us to place spiritual custody
awards in their proper constitutional context.
A. Strict Scrutiny Review
Free exercise rights are not unlimited. Courts have often drawn
a distinction between the right to have religious beliefs and the right
to act upon them. The so-called belief/action dichotomy was first
drawn in Reynolds v. United States, 2 3 which is generally considered the
"first major 'free exercise' case"24 and is still used today.2
The early cases following Reynolds only protected religious beliefs,
leaving government with a great deal of latitude to regulate individ-
ual action.2 6 This government power was greatly reduced in Cantwell
v. Connecticut. 2 7 The Cantwell Court, in holding that a statute prohib-
iting unlicensed solicitation of religious contributions infringed
upon free exercise rights, implied that strictjudicial scrutiny must be
applied to state actions that limit an individual's religious acts. The
Court found that the asserted governmental objective of preventing
fraud and preserving the public peace could be achieved by less
restrictive means, 2' and that the statute must be "narrowly
drawn."29 The Court went on to note that "the power to regulate
must be so exercised as not... [to] unduly... infringe [upon] the
protected freedom."
30
The stiffening standard of judicial review alluded to in Cantwell
23 98 U.s. 145 (1878). The Reynolds Court affirmed a Mormon's conviction for
polygamy despite his contention that his actions were compelled by his religious
beliefs. The Court held that "[li]aws are made for the government of actions, and
while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with
practices." Id. at 166.
24 G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1510 (11 th ed. 1985).
25 See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 702 (1986); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 402-03 (1963).
26 See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 14-6, at 1183 n.33. (2d ed.
1988).
27 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
28 See id. at 304-07.
29 Id. at 311.
30 Id. at 304. When viewed with other cases in which the Court struck down
statutes requiring permits for religious solicitation, see Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105, 114-17 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), Cantwell
"establish[ed] a basic principle: The government's secular purpose must be tightly
linked to the burden the government imposes on religion; if the government can
approximately attain its goal without burdening religion, then it must follow that
path, regardless of how compelling the goal may be." L. TRIBE, supra note 26, § 14-
13, at 1253.
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was expressly set forth in Sherbert v. Verner.3 ' In Sherbert, a Seventh
Day Adventist who refused to work on her Sabbath day, Saturday,
was denied unemployment compensation on the grounds that she
would not accept suitable work. The Court reversed the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court's ruling that the claim denial was permitted, 2
finding the state action to be violative of the free exercise clause.
3 3
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, set forth a strict scrutiny
test for free exercise review. Brennan found that in order to deter-
mine if the state action was allowable, it was necessary to "consider
whether some compelling state interest . . .justifies the substantial
infringement of appellant's First Amendment right."3 4 Justice Bren-
nan went on to state that even if such a compelling interest existed, a
"substantial infringement" of the appellant's free exercise rights
would not be justified unless the state "demonstrate[d] that no alter-
native forms of regulation would combat such abuses without
infringing First Amendment rights.3 5
Courts and commentators consistently have restated Justice
Brennan's test as one that upholds state action infringing upon an
individual's right to practice religion only if the state meets the bur-
den of proving that the action is the least restrictive means of achiev-
ing a compelling state end (or interest). The least restrictive means/
compelling ends test has become the accepted standard for free
exercise review.
3 6
31 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
32 Id at 401-02. The South Carolina Supreme Court had specifically held that
the "appellant's ineligibility infringed on constitutional liberties upon the appellant's
freedom of religion ...." Id. at 401.
33 See id. at 410.
34 Id 374 U.S. at 406 (emphasis added).
35 Id. at 407 (emphasis added).
36 See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987) (noting
that infringements upon religious practice are to be subject to strict scrutiny and can
be upheld only by proof of a compelling interest by the state); In re Marriage Of
Gove, 117 Ariz. 324, 327, 572 P.2d 458, 461 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (stating that
whereas the freedom to believe is absolute, the state may regulate the exercise of
religion if a compelling state interest exists); Fisher v. Fisher, 118 Mich. App. 227,
231, 324 N.W.2d 582, 584 (1982) (stating that a state can deny the exercise of
religious freedom only if the state shows the existence of an overriding interest of the
highest order and that the least intrusive means of achieving that interest are used).
For alternative formulations of the strict scrutiny text, see notes 43-47 and
accompanying text.
The precise contours of the strict scrutiny test set forth by Justice Brennan,
namely, that state action which infringes upon an individual's freedom to practice her
religion must be the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state end, see
infra note 36 and accompanying text, has become the topic of debate in recent years.
Arguments have been made that in recent cases the Court has not always applied the
1989]
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The Court's hesitancy to interfere with the free exercise rights of
families is exemplified by Wisconsin v. Yoder 7 in which the Court
upheld the rights of Amish parents to keep their children out of
school in derogation of a state statute. 8 In Yoder, the Court
accepted the Amish parent's contention that the state law compelling
school attendance until their children reached the age of sixteen vio-
lated their free exercise rights.3 9 In reaching their decision, the
Court took a narrow view of the state's asserted compelling need-
namely, to educate its citizens in order to allow them to become
"self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society."40 The Court
examined closely the objectives behind the alleged state purpose and
found that the state did not meet the strict standard of demonstrat-
ing that their action was the least restrictive means to a compelling
end.4 The Court stated that although a minimum level of education
may be necessary, the state did not prove that it was compelling that
Amish children receive a high school education.4 2 In order to satisfy
strict scrutiny model, but has instead utilized a variety of levels of scrutiny in different
situations. See infra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
37 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Yoder illustrates the limits of the state power ofparens
patriae in religious areas. It shows that parents are given autonomy over the religious
training of their children. Therefore, inhibitions of the free exercise rights of
children will be construed as an interference with the free exercise rights of their
parents. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
38 See id. at 234.
39 See id. at 230-31.
40 Id. at 221.
41 See id. at 236. Although the opinion by ChiefJustice Burger did not expressly
employ the language of Sherbert, the sum and substance of his analysis was consistent
with the least restrictive means to a compelling end standard. ChiefJustice Burger
stated that "[tihe essence of all that has been said and written about [the free exercise
clause] is that only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise
served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion." Id at 215.
42 See id. at 221-27. One might argue that the state could have characterized as
compelling its need to have uniform standards that would result in a strong school
system. Under an incidental effects analysis, see infra notes 47-49 and accompanying
text, such an argument might have led to a different result. In U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252 (1982), the Court denied the claims of Amish employers that their free exercise
rights should exempt them from paying social security taxes. The Court held that the
maintenance of "the fiscal vitality of the social security system" satisfied the
government's burden of demonstrating a compelling interest. Id. 455 U.S. at 258-59.
Some commentators have argued that Lee suggests a loosening of the strict
scrutiny test. Laurence Tribe has noted that "[t]o the degree that the state's interest
is defined to include the program as a whole, the state will find it easier to present a
compelling interest, and thereby to pass its first hurdle." L. TRIBE, supra note 26,
§ 14-13, at 1261. This analysis is suspect. Yoder can be distinguished from Lee in that
the Yoder Court was satisfied that allowing the Amish children to leave school two
years earlier would not harm the system. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 222-26, 235-36
(describing the long history and peculiar characteristics of the Amish which qualified
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the strict scrutiny standard, the Court demanded that the state estab-
lish specific problems that would occur if the Amish were to practice
their religion as they desired. Absent a specific showing of demon-
strable harm, the Court refused to accept the state's "highly specula-
tive" argument that the children would leave the Amish community
and be ill equipped for life.4"
- While Yoder plainly demonstrates that specific objectives must be
shown to withstand an allegation of free exercise infringement,
recent cases have led to the suggestion that the Court has relaxed its
free exercise standard of review.44 While the Court may have
relaxed its scrutiny of free exercise issues in certain instances, it
would be a gross exaggeration to suggest that the Court has aban-
doned strict scrutiny in the free exercise context. Although the pre-
cise contours of the Court's strict scrutiny language have varied
periodically, the Sherbert strict scrutiny test was expressly affirmed by
the Court in Hobbie v. Unemployment Commission,45 when the Court
stated that "infringements [upon free exercise] must be subject to
strict scrutiny and could be justified only by proof by the State of a
them for the exemption). The court specifically stated that "few other religious
groups or sects could make" the required showing to allow an exemption from the
public school system. Id. at 236.
Even if one accepts the contention that Lee represents a loosening of the Sherbert
standard, such a development should have no impact on the review of a spiritual
custody award. There is no systematic effect with these awards as they are unique to
the parties involved in a given dispute. For further discussion of suggestions that the
standard of review for free exercise claims has been loosened, see infra notes 44-49
and accompanying text.
43 Yoder, at 224.
44 For examples of cases in which the Court found no free exercise violations,
see Lyng v. N.W. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319, 1327 (1988)
(allowing the federal government to harvest timber and build roads in area
traditionally used for Indian worship); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 711-12 (1986)
(rejecting claim that requiring a Native American to give a social security number for
his daughter as a prerequisite to eligibility for public assistance programs was a free
exercise violation); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 510 (1985) (upholding
military dress codes prohibiting the wearing of visible religious headgear); Tony &
Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 306 (1985) (rejecting
exemption for religious group from minimum wage and labor laws); BobJones Univ.
v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604-05 (1983) (rejecting tax-exempt status for
discriminatory racially religious university).
Tribe suggests that there has been an "unconfessed readjustment of the free
exercise test." L. TRIBE, supra note 26, § 14-13, at 1260. He classifies the new test
as a "required showing... that an unusually important goal can be achieved only
through uniform enforcement of the regulation in question .... " Id. § 14-13, at
1251. Tribe's analysis here in some ways stresses the semantic more than the
substantive. He draws his language of "an unusually important goal" from a dissent
by Justice O'Connor in Goldman. Id. § 14-12, at 1242 n.1.
45 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
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compelling interest. "46 At best, rather than abandoning strict scru-
tiny, the Court appears to be moving towards a modified level of
scrutiny in certain free exercise cases. This approach was utilized in
Lyng v. N. W Indian Cemetery Protective Association. 4 7 In Lyng, American
Indians claimed that their free exercise rights would be infringed
upon by the construction of highways and the harvesting of timber
on federally owned land that the Indians historically had used for
religious purposes. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority,
accepted the precedents of Sherbert and Yoder, but refused to apply a
strict scrutiny test to the free exercise claim. The Court held that
situations involving the:
incidental effects of government programs, which may make it
more difficult to practice certain religions but which have no ten-
dency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious
beliefs [do not] require government to bring forward a compelling
justification for its otherwise lawful actions. The crucial word in
the constitutional text is "prohibit": "For the Free Exercise Clause
is written in terms of what the government cannot do to the indi-
vidual, not in terms of what the individual can exact from the
government."
4 8
Justice O'Connor thus seems to be suggesting a two-tiered level
of scrutiny for free exercise claims. Under this theory, strict scrutiny
would continue to apply when governmental action directly restricts
an individual's right to free exercise, but a lesser standard of review
would be utilized when the alleged infringement could be classified
as an "incidental effect." 49 Spiritual custody awards place a direct
burden on the custodial parent's right to exercise her religious
beliefs. Strict scrutiny thus is the appropriate standard for review to
determine if such awards are permissible. It is therefore necessary to
examine whether a compelling state interest can be identified.
46 Id. at 141. In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell wrote "[this Court's
decision last term in Bowen v. Roy did nothing to undercut the applicability of Sherbert
.... Id. at 147 (Powell, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
47 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
48 Id. at 1326 (citations omitted).
49 Id.; see also L. TRIBE, supra note 26, § 14-13, at 1262-63 (arguing that strict
scrutiny will be applied in cases where the state action compels an individual to
choose between his religious obligations and "the enjoyment of government benefits
... or ... avoidance of a government burden like criminal prosecution" while a
looser level of judicial review will be applied in situations where "government
measures . . . are not triggered by the religious choice in question, but burden
religious activity only in a manner ancillary to an undeniably secular choice").
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B. Compelling Interests-Common Characteristics
The Court has found state interests of a magnitude sufficient to
justify infringement of individuals' free exercise rights in a variety of
circumstances. Despite religious objections, federal and state gov-
ernments and courts have been allowed to:
1) Prohibit children from engaging in religious solicitation.
50
2) Require mandatory military dress codes.
5 1
3) Require religious groups to follow minimum wage and other
labor laws.
52
4) Prohibit parades/marches on public roads without a license.
53
5) Prohibit the growing and use of marijuana.
54
6) Prohibit polygamy. 55
7) Require blood transfusions for a child.56
8) Restrict individual's rights to practice their religion in child cus-
tody battles to promote the "best interests of the child." 57
One could argue, after analyzing the state interests described above,
that the state objectives courts have found to be compelling are nar-
rowly drawn specific ends which either: (a) promote public health;
(b) prevent physical harm; or (c) prevent acts which the state would
classify as morally depraved.
It is inherently difficult to classify an amorphous objective as
compelling. Therefore, constitutional applications of strict scrutiny
review require the identification of precise state objectives.
5 8
Among the state interests identified above, protecting the "best
interests of the child" is certainly the vaguest. This standard's lack of
50 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169-70 (1944).
51 See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507-10 (1985).
52 See Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 304-06
(1985).
53 See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576-58 (1940).
54 See, e.g., Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 878 F.2d 1458, 1463 (D.C. Cir.
1989); People v. Torrwa, 133 Cal. App. 3d 265, 276-77, 184 Cal. Rptr. 39, 46 (1982).
But see People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 727, 394 P.2d 813, 821 (1964) (allowing the
use of peyote by Navajos because peyote was such an integral part of the religion that
to ban its use amounted to a ban on the practice of that religion); L. TRIBE, supra note
26, § 14-13, at 1269 & nn.105-07 (discussing pro and con arguments of courts
allowing individuals to use illegal drugs based on free exercise claims).
55 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S( 145 (1879).
56 See Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 278 F. Supp. 488, 502-05
(W.D. Wash. 1967), aff'd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968).
57 See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
58 See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 26, § 14-13, at 1252 ("[The Cantwell Court
was requiring... the use of 'a statute narrowly drawn to define and punish specific
conduct .. ' "); ia- § 14-13, at 1269 ("If the harm is ill-defined ... an exemption
[from state power to restrict activity] must be granted.").
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specificity has caused it to be the subject of a great deal of criticism.
5 9
While states undeniably have interests in protecting children, it is
often difficult to identify what constitutes the child's best interests.
While "[c]ertain widely recognized harms-such as physical injury-
can be prevented even at the cost of infringing religious freedom...
the state cannot impose its ideal of the 'best possible life' as a way of
justifying intrusion upon the religious autonomy of a citizen."
60
Therefore, it is important to probe the underlying objectives of the
"best interests" standard in order to identify specific goals that are
consistent with previously identified compelling interests. The
extent to which the best interests standard can be used to justify the
free exercise restrictions that accompany a spiritual custody award
can then be determined.
II. SPIRITUAL CUSTODY
Spiritual custody debates have occurred for many years. 6 1 The
59 See infra notes 80, 125 and accompanying text.
60 L. TRIBE, supra note 26, § 14-13, at 1258 (footnote omitted).
61 Spiritual custody issues arise primarily in two contexts. The first occurs when
the parents are unable to agree on the child's religion and the court unilaterally
decides to make the award in the child's best interests. See, e.g., Simms v. Simms, No.
87DR3301, transcript at 11 (Dist. Ct. Denver County, Colo. Dec. 29, 1987); Stern v.
Stern, 40 Ii. App. 2d 374, 188 N.E.2d 97 (1963); Grayman v. Hession, 84 A.D.2d
111, 446 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1982). In the second context, spiritual custody questions
arise when the court is asked to enforce an antenuptial agreement, a private contract
which the parents entered into after their separation, wherein they stipulated to their
respective rights and responsibilities. See Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d
89, 90, 432 N.E.2d 765, 766, 447 N.Y.S.2d 893, 894 (1982); Perlstein v. Perlstein, 76
A.D.2d 49, 51-52,429 N.Y.S.2d 896, 898 (1980); Hackett v. Hackett, 150 N.E.2d 431,
432 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
An argument can be made that the constitutional issue at stake differs in the two
situations. The degree of court infringement is arguably less severe when it is
enforcing a private contract as opposed to taking unilateral action. Many courts,
however, have held that antenuptial contracts are not subject to the ordinary
protections of contract law. In Hackett, the court refused to support the Protestant
wife's promise to raise the children as Catholic per the terms of a privately-arranged
separation agreement. In holding that the provisions of the antenuptial agreement
related to the children's religious training were unenforceable, the court used a best
interests type of rationale and stated:
To suggest that the agreement will only be enforced if the child's
temporal welfare is not thereby prejudiced is meaningless; it is inevitable
that, if an unwilling parent is forced by a court of law to rear his child in a
religion in which he disbelieves, the child will suffer.... [T]he courts ...
should not be party to the injustice by enforcing the contract against a
third party maleficiary.
Hackett, 150 N.E.2d at 439 (quoting Pfeffer, Religion in the Upbringing of Children, 35
B.U.L. REv. 333, 363 (1955)). For other courts which have refused to uphold such
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issue has arisen in custody battles between: Agnostics and those with
religious beliefs;62 Jews and Christians;63, members of different
Christian faiths;' and individuals who practice different forms of
Judaism. 65 The spiritual custody concept historically has received
clauses, see, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 213 Ga. 545, 547-50, 100 S.E.2d 289, 292-93
(1957) (concluding that contract provision cannot override judicial discretion to
make decisions that will further the best interests of the child); Lynch v. Uhlenhopp,
248 Iowa 68, 72-73, 78 N.W.2d 491,494, 496, 500 (1956) (holding such clauses void
for indefiniteness, uncertainty, and constitutional violations); Jenks v. Jenks, 385
S.W.2d 370, 377 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964) (concluding that contract provisions cannot
override judicial discretion to make decisions that will further the best interests of the
child).
Even those cases which do support the enforcement of such agreements subject
such enforcement to the limits of the best interest standard. New York courts have
shown a willingness to support such contracts. See, e.g., Perlstein v. Perlstein, 76 A.D.
2d 49, 53, 429 N.Y.S.2d 896, 899 (1980) ("That parents may contract to have their
children brought up in observance of a certain religious lifestyle is well established in
this State."); Gluckstern v. Gluckstern, 31 Misc. 2d 58, 59, 220 N.Y.S.2d 623, 623-24
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961) (supporting an antenuptial agreement which stipulated that a
child will be brought "up in the Orthodox Jewish faith," despite objections of a cus-
todial Christian Scientist mother); Shearer v. Shearer, 73 N.Y.S.2d 337, 358 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1947) (holding that a Protestant wife's agreement to raise children as Catho-
lic is an enforceable contract). Yet, even New York courts will not enforce the con-
tracts unless the judge determines that such enforcement promotes the best interests
of the child. See, e.g., Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89, 94-96, 447
N.Y.S.2d 895, 895-96, 432 N.E.2d 765, 768 (1982) (supporting enforcement of ante-
nuptial agreement but noting that "[t]he standard ultimately to be applied remains
the best interests of the child"); Spring v. Glawon, 89 A.D.2d 980, 981, 454 N.Y.S.2d
140, 142 (1982) (stating that " 'where the parents, by agreement, have imposed rea-
sonable restraints upon the custodial parent in the upbringing of the child, those
restraints will be enforced unless it can be demonstrated.., that enforcement would
not be in the best interest of the child'" (emphasis added)); Schwarzman v.
Schwarzman, 88 Misc. 2d 866, 874, 388 N.Y.S.2d 993, 998 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976)
("Ante-nuptial agreements regarding religious rearing of children are enforceable to
the extent that they provide for the best interests and welfare of the child." (emphasis added)).
Courts are thus, in effect, using one standard by employing the best interests
analysis regardless of whether an antenuptial agreement exists. Therefore, for pur-
poses of this Comment, no distinction based on the existence or nonexistence of an
antenuptial agreement will be drawn when analyzing the constitutionality of using
the child's best interest as a standard of review in awarding spiritual custody.
62 See Robert 0. v.Judy E., 90 Misc. 2d 439, 395 N.Y.S.2d 351 (N.Y. Fain. Ct.
1977).
63 See, e.g., Funk v. Ossman, 150 Ariz. 578, 579-80, 724 P.2d 1247, 1248-49
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Gottlieb v. Gottlieb, 31 111. App. 2d 120, 123-24, 175 N.E.2d
619, 621 (1961); Schwarzman v. Schwarzman, 88 Misc. 2d 866, 868-69, 388 N.Y.S.2d
993, 995 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).
64 See, e.g., Vazquez v. Vazquez, 443 So. 2d 313, 314 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983);
Esposito v. Esposito, 41 N.J. 143, 144-45, 195 A.2d 295, 296 (1963); Hackett v.
Hackett, 150 N.E.2d 431, 434 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
65 See, e.g., Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89, 90-91, 432 N.E.2d 765,
766-67, 447 N.Y.S.2d 893, 894-95 (1982); Perlstein v. Perlstein, 76 A.D.2d 49, 429
N.Y.S.2d 896 (1980).
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only limited support. Most courts have held that the custodial parent
retains the right to determine the child's religious upbringing.66 In
doing so, however, the courts have based their decisions on the neb-
ulous theory of the child's best interests. Based upon this broad
rationale, numerous courts have given the noncustodial parent con-
trol over the child's religious upbringing despite the objections of
the custodial parent. 67 These decisions limit the custodial parent's
right to pass her religion on to her children. Barring a demonstra-
tion that they represent the least restrictive means of achieving a
compelling state end, such decisions unconstitutionally infringe
upon the custodial parent's free exercise right.68 It is important,
therefore, to determine whether the state's asserted end of promot-
ing the child's best interests may properly be classified as
compelling.
A. Parental Autonomy and Judicial Intervention
An examination of the spiritual custody concept must begin with
an analysis of the basis for judicial intervention into family life. As a
66 See, e.g., Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 248 Iowa 68, 81, 78 N.W.2d 491, 499 (1956)
("'The parent to whom custody is awarded must logically and naturally be the one
who lawfully exercises the greater control and influence over the child.'" (citation
omitted));Jenks v.Jenks, 385 S.W.2d 370, 377 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964) ("Considerations
of the most practical kind . . . dictate that.., the duty of attending to the details of
the child's rearing be delegated to a custodian, and.., that the custodian be vested
... with that degree of discretion upon which the expeditious exercise of authority
invariably depends."); Esposito v. Esposito, 41 NJ. 143, 146, 195 A.2d 295, 297
(1963) ("Custody normally carries with it full control of the child's religious
upbringing."); see also Mangrum, Exclusive Reliance On Best Interest May Be
Unconstitutional: Religion As A Factor In Child Custody Cases, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 25,
53 (1981) ("American courts have held that the custodial parent has discretionary
control over the religious training of the child .. "); Strickman, Marriage, Divorce and
the Constitution, 15 FAM. L.Q. 259, 337 (1981) ("The normal practice in state courts
has been to leave the religious upbringing of a child wholly within the hands of the
custodial parent."); Annotation, Religion as Factor in Child Custody and Visitation Cases,
22 A.L.R. 4th 971, 977 (1983) (stating that "most... courts seem to ... make the
choice of custodian on strictly nonreligious grounds and then to commit to the
custodian so chosen the right to control the child's religious education").
67 See, e.g., Simms v. Simms, No. 87DR3301, transcript at 11 (Dist. Ct. Denver
County, Colo. Dec. 29, 1987); Vazquez v. Vazquez, 443 So. 2d 313, 314 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983); Stern v. Stem, 40 Ill. App. 2d 374, 376-78, 380-84, 188 N.E.2d 97, 98,
100-101 (1963); Gottlieb v. Gottlieb, 31 111. App. 2d 120, 121-27, 175 N.E.2d 619,
620-622, 627 (1961); Spring v. Glawon, 89 A.D.2d 980, 980-81, 454 N.Y.S.2d 140,
141-142 (1982); Grayman v. Hession, 84 A.D.2d 111, 111-12,446 N.Y.S.2d 505, 506
(1982); Perlstein v. Perlstein, 76 A.D.2d 49, 51-52, 429 N.Y.S.2d 896, 898-99 (1980);
Gluckstern v. Gluckstern, 31 Misc. 2d 58, 59-60, 220 N.Y.S. 2d 623, 624 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1961).
68 See supra notes 36-49 and accompanying text.
SPIRITUAL CUSTODY A WARDS
general principle, parents have the freedom to raise their children as
they see fit. This freedom includes the right to educate and expose
children to religion in accordance with the parents' own beliefs.69
Although constitutional protection extends to a "parent in... his or
her relationship with and authority over the child,"-70 this protection
breaks down when there is a divorce and a battle for the custody of
children ensues. As one commentator has noted, "[c]hild custody
contests necessitate state mediation to determine which parent will be
chiefly responsible for raising the child.",71 The state thus utilizes its
power under the theory of "parenspatriae to intervene in family affairs
where the physical or mental well-being of the child is imminently
and substantially threatened.,
7 2
As a result of the need to find a caretaker for the child, "[tihe
state is thrust into the role of mediator by necessity" in child custody
cases. 7 1 In theory, "[c]ustody 'embraces the sum of... rights with
respect to rearing a child .... It includes the right to . .. make
decisions regarding his care and control, education, health and reli-
gion .... 7' The necessity of finding a home for a child who is not
69 The Supreme Court has held that parents' rights to raise, educate, and
choose the religious training for their children are protected under the theory of
substantive due process as provided in the fifth and fourteenth amendments. See, e.g.,
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232-33 (1972) (protecting the "fundamental
interest of parents, as contrasted with that of the State, to guide the religious future
and education of their children"); Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943) (holding that a state may not compel children to salute the flag in school when
it conflicts with their parents' religious beliefs because such action invades "the
sphere of intellect and spirit" which the first amendment protects); Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (discussing parents' fundamental right to
"direct the upbringing and education of children under their control").
70 Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156,
1313 (1980) [hereinafter Developments in the Law].
71 Note, The Religious Upbringing of Children After Divorce, 56 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
160, 164 (1980) (emphasis added).
72 Mangrum, supra note 66, at 65. For further discussion of the state's power to
intrude into family life under the doctrine ofparens patriae, see Developments in the Law,
supra note 70, at 1326; Comment, Child Custody: Best Interests of Children vs.
Constitutional Rights of Parents, 81 DICK. L. REV. 733, 734-36 (1977).
73 Developments in the Law, supra note 70, at 1326.
74 I. ELLMAN, P. KURTZ & A. STANTON, FAMILY LAW 463 (1986) (citations
omitted). In analyzing custody issues, courts and commentators sometimes draw a
distinction between physical and legal custody. Physical custody refers to the
responsibility that accompanies the party with whom the child lives. In other words,
"[t]he person with legal custody has the full bundle of decisionmaking rights with
regard to the child." Id. at 464. Recently, courts have become increasingly flexible in
structuring custody awards. Whereas in the past custody was almost automatically
awarded to the mother, it is no longer uncommon for fathers to seek and receive
custody of their children. In addition, the concept of joint custody, where the
parents share responsibility for the child, has received increasing support.
1989]
598 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 138:583
capable of caring for herself can easily be categorized as a compel-
ling state interest because it has a direct impact on the physical well-
being of a citizen. A court thus is justified when it moves into the
normally protected zone of child-rearing to protect a child who has
become the innocent victim of a family breakdown. When a court
enters an area that ordinarily enjoys fundamental protection, how-
ever, it is presumed that it will proceed cautiously and narrowly in its
actions. The court's goal should be to restore the child to the most
normal situation possible.
75
B. The Best Interests Standard
The basic theory underlying the best interests standard, the
"universal[ ]"76 standard for custody decisions, is that the interests
of the child take precedence over the interests of any other party
involved in the dispute. This theory contrasts with previous ideas
that the parents' interests were paramount. The doctrine evolved
from the recognition that "children are not chattels to be disposed of
according to the wishes of their parents or anyone else, but that they
are intelligent moral beings, and as such their welfare and their hap-
Expanding judicial creativity in this area raises the possibility of an increase in
spiritual custody awards. See infra notes 87-89, 94-96 and accompanying text.
75 See generallyJ. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD 31-34, 37-38 (1979) (discussing the need to provide stability for the
child as quickly as possible after a divorce and recommending total decisionmaking
authority regarding childrearing conditions be placed with the custodial parent to
"safeguard the child's need for [stability and] continuity of relationships").
76 See Strickman, supra note 66, at 327. The "best interests" standard has
developed under state laws and has been generally accepted by state courts. See, e.g.,
In re Marriage Of Short, 698 P.2d 1310, 1312 (Colo. 1985) (stating that the
"overriding concern in any custody proceeding must be the welfare and best
interests of the child"); Asch v. Asch, 164 NJ. Super. 499, 505, 397 A.2d 352, 355
(1978) (stating that it "is axiomatic that the court should seek to advance the best
interests of the child where her parents are unable to agree on the course to be
followed"); Grayman v. Hession, 84 A.D.2d 111, 112, 446 N.Y.S. 2d 505, 506 (1982)
(noting that it "is well settled that the best interests of the child are the foremost
consideration in a custody proceeding").
The extent to which the Court would be bound by the best interests standard,
however, is open to debate. In Developments in the Law, supra note 70, at 1327, the
authors argue that "[g]iving the best interests standard any general constitutional
content appears to be impossible" and thus "constitutional protection of parental
interests in custody of, companionship with, and authority over the child may be the
key to recognition of affirmative constitutional rights for each parent in a custody
dispute." Id. at 1329. Strickman also raises the question and concludes that
although it remains a consideration, there is "nothing in the Constitution
demanding" that the best interests doctrine be the ultimate standard for
consideration. Strickman, supra, at 329.
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piness is a matter of first consideration."77 As a result, bright line
tests such as the common law paternal preference 78 and the "tender
years" doctrine79 no longer serve as the basis for custody decisions.
The best interests of the child doctrine, however, is vague and
indeterminate. This lack of precision has allowed the doctrine to
become "a phrase ready-made to justify the court's delving into vir-
tually any area of the parents' lives, and to support any conclusion it
finally draws."8" As a result, the test fails to provide the narrowly
tailored specific objective that is normally required of a compelling
state interest.8" In many ways the best interests standard merely
begs the question as to how the court should settle child custody
disputes. As one court stated, "[t]he only absolute in the law gov-
erning custody of children is that there are no absolutes."8 2
Many states, including eight states that have adopted the Uni-
form Marriage and Divorce Act ("UMDA"), 3 have strengthened the
77 M. PLOSCOWE, H. FOSTER & D. FREED, FAMILY LAW 882 (1972) (quoting 2 W.
NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT 212-14 (1945)).
78 See Mangrum, supra note 66, at 31-43 (describing the common law rule
whereby a father had a vested right in his children that was superior to all the claims
of all other parties, and noting modern departures from the early common law).
79 Under the tender years doctrine, there is a presumption that young children
are best served by placing them with their mothers. A father needs to overcome a
heavy burden of proof to receive custody of his children. See I. ELLMAN, P. KURTZ &
A. STANTON, supra note 74, at 476-77. Although the tender years doctrine has
generally been supplanted by the best interests test, it is not completely dead and is
still occasionally considered by some courts. See Duran v. Weaver, 495 So. 2d 1355,
1357 (Miss. 1986) (stating that the tender years doctrine is "one factor to be
considered in child custody cases").
80 Comment, supra note 72, at 735; see also Mangrum, supra note 66, at 30
(criticizing the "completely discretionary" use of the standard); Strickman, supra note
66, at 333 (stating that "[i]n custody disputes, a trial court is dealing in the nether
world of the 'best interests of the child,' where judicial techniques are most suspect
for their inability to project accurately the impact of subtle environmental factors on
the emotional health of human beings"); Developments in the Law, supra note 70, at
1327 ("[I]t is virtually impossible to predict the effect of particular childrearing
practices upon the child. Most commentators have thus recognized that the best
interests standard is usually indeterminate in the contested custody context."); Note,
supra note 71, at 165 ("Critics insist that the standard is so inconsistently applied that
it is no more than 'a cloak forjudicial discretion and intuition.'" (quoting MillerJoint
Custody, 13 FAM. L.Q. 345, 354 (1979))).
81 See supra notes 49-60 and accompanying text.
82 Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89, 93, 432 N.E. 2d 765, 767, 447
N.Y.S.2d 893, 895 (1982).
83 See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-311 - 25-339 (1976 & Supp. 1988); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 14-2-101-113 (Parts I, II), § 14-10-101-133 (Parts III, IV) (1987 & Supp.
1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40 101-802 (Smith-Hurd 1980 & Supp. 1989); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 403.010, 403.110-403.350 (Baldwin 1984 & Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 518.002-518.66 (West Supp. 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 452.300-452.415
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best interests standard by codifying it in a variety of statutory
forms. 84 In an effort to limit the discretionary nature of the best
interests standard, the UMDA lists specific factors that a judge may
consider in making her award.85 In addition, section 408 of the
UMDA specifically attempts to limit a judge's potential to interfere
with the day to day decisions of the custodial parent under the best
interests standard. The section entitled "Judicial Supervision"
provides:
Except as otherwise agreed by the parties in writing at the time of
the custody decree, the custodian may determine the child's
upbringing, including his education, health care and religious
training, unless the court ... finds, upon motion by the noncus-
todial parent, that in the absence of a specific limitation of the cus-
todian's authority, the child's physical health would be endangered
or his emotional development significantly impaired.8 6
The comment following this section indicates a preference for family
privacy and states that "the custodial parent should be... the person
responsible for post-divorce decisions concerning the upbringing of
the child." The comment goes on to recommend that, absent an
antenuptial agreement, there should be no court intervention in the
custodial parent's decisions in raising the child unless such "decision
would 'endanger the child's physical health or significantly impair his
emotional development'-a standard patently more onerous than
the 'best interest' test."-
8 7
In formulating this section, the drafters of the UMDA demon-
strated that they were keenly aware of the potential danger for abuse
of judicial discretion left open under the best interests standard.
The position taken by the UMDA directly opposes the burdensome
court interference that accompanies a spiritual custody award,
instead suggesting that the compelling end facing a court in a cus-
tody situation is the need to place the child. Once this specific goal is
(Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1989); MoNT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-4-101 - 40-4-221 (1987);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.010 -26.09.902 (1986 & Supp. 1989).
84 See Mangrum supra note 66, at 43-44.
85 These factors include: 1) the wishes of the parents; 2) the wishes of the child;
3) interaction with family members or others significantly affecting the child's well-
being; 4) the child's adjustment to home school and community and; 5) the mental
and physical health of all pertinent individuals. See UNIFORM MARRIAGE & DIVORCE
AcT § 402 U.L.A. (1987). A few states expressly list religion or spiritual well-being as
a factor which a judge may consider in determining the child's best interests. See
ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c)(1) (1983); HAw. REV. STAT. § 571-46(5) (1985); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 20-3-160 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
86 UNIFORM MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 408 U.L.A. (1987).
87 UNIFORM MARRIAGE & DIVORCE AT § 408 comment U.L.A. (1987).
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accomplished, there is less justification for continued judicial inter-
ference with family decisions. When judicial decisions have an
impact on highly protected constitutional zones, as spiritual custody
awards do, the need to limit judicial involvement becomes particu-
larly cogent. Despite its efforts, however, the UMDA does not solve
the problem of unlimited judicial discretion in the name of the
child's best interests. In addition to the fact that it has only been
adopted by eight states,"8 the UMDA allows judicial intervention
when an antenuptial agreement exists."9 Moreover, because courts
are used to exercising wide discretion under the best interests stan-
dard, the limited judicial discretion urged in the comment following
section 408 has often been ignored. The Sim=s spiritual custody
award, for example, was issued in Colorado, a state that has
expressly adopted the UMDA.9 ° Thus, while they may be helpful,
statutory standards do not offer a panacea of protection from the
wide potential for judicial discretion implied under the best interests
standard.
The- best interests standard has provided courts with a broad
mantle to consider religious questions when an interfaith marriage
ends in divorce. Although courts generally are sensitive to the possi-
ble constitutional issues that may arise in these instances, they con-
sistently have been willing to use the best interests doctrine tojustify
the consideration of religious issues in child custody disputes. 9 1
88 See supra note 78.
89 See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
90 Simms v. Simms, No. 87DR3301, transcript at 8-9 (Dist. Ct. Denver County,
Colo. Dec. 29, 1987). Although one might argue that Colorado's adoption of the
UMDA dictates a different result, a heavy burden is placed on a party who tries to
overturn a trial court's finding of fact under the best interests standard. See, e.g.,
Brown v. Alabama Dept. of Pensions & Security, 473 So. 2d 533, 534 (Ala. Civ. App.
1985) ("In child custody cases . . . [the trial] court's decision is presumed to be
correct and will not be set aside on appeal, unless it is shown to be plainly and
palpably wrong."); Gratrix v. Gratrix, 652 P.2d 76, 79 (Alaska 1982) (stating that
"child custody determinations are among the most difficult in the law and.., trial
courts are vested with broad discretion" and in "reviewing a superior court's ruling
... we will apply the 'clearly erroneous' standard").
91 In the case of In re Marriage of Heriford, 586 S.W.2d 769 (Mo. Ct. App.
1979), the court stated:
No area in the realm of decisions in child custody cases is more fraught
with difficulty than where differences in religious beliefs of the parents
exist. The courts have shown a constitutional reluctance and, indeed
refused, to be placed in a position of deciding the merits or validity of
conflicting religious differences between parents. Rather, they have
applied to such a situation the so firmly rooted principle of what is in the
best interests of the children involved ....
Id. at 772.
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Religion and its effects on children have been raised in a variety of
contexts including questions regarding:
- Whether a parent's religious practices or lack thereof can pre-
clude custody.
9 2
- The religious rights of and restrictions on the noncustodial
parent.
93
- The religious rights of and restrictions on the custodial
parent.
94
As interfaith marriage and divorce rates rise, courts will deal with
those issues more frequently. When viewed in conjunction with a
number of rapid societal changes, the best interests standard may
encourage courts to play a more creative role when deciding custody
matters.
Joint custody awards offer one example of a trend towards
increasingly flexible custody decisions. As the number of mothers
working outside the home has risen, there has been an expanding
judicial recognition of fathers' rights.9 5 This has led to the growth of
joint custody awards which have "been described as a 'small revolu-
tion . . . in child custody law.' "96 Joint custody awards can take
many forms.9 7 The central idea behind the concept is that parents
92 See, e.g., Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1236, 1242-43 (Alaska 1979); In
re Marriage of Short, 698 P.2d 1310, 1313 (Colo. 1985); Osier v. Osier, 410 A.2d
1027, 1029 (Me. 1980).
93 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Mentry, 142 Cal. App. 3d 260, 262, 268-69, 190 Cal.
Rptr. 843, 844, 849-50 (1983); Felton v. Felton, 383 Mass. 232, 232-33, 418 N.E.2d.
606, 606-07 (1981); Sina v. Sina, 402 N.W.2d 573, 575-76 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
94 See, e.g., Simms, transcript at 11-12; Grayman v. Hession, 84 A.D.2d 111, 111-
12, 446 N.Y.S.2d 505, 506 (1982); Stern v. Stern, 40 Ill. App. 2d 374, 376-78, 380-
84, 188 N.E.2d 97, 98, 100-01 (1963).
95 See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389-94 (holding that a statute which
gave unmarried mothers more rights regarding adoption of children than unmarried
fathers violates the Equal Protection Clause); I. ELLMAN, P. KURTZ & A. STANTON,
supra note 74, at 886-89 (discussing the increasing judicial recognition of the rights of
unwed fathers); see also Comment, The Tender Years Presumption: Do the Children Bear the
Burden, 21 S.D.L. REV. 332, 337-50 (1976) (arguing that the tender years doctrine is
unconstitutional).
96 1. ELLMAN, P. KURTZ & A. STANTON, supra note 74, at 540 (quoting Scott &
Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIo ST. LJ. 455, 455 (1984)).
97 Four primary types ofjoint custody awards have been identified:
I) long-term block time, with children spending alternate years with each
parent or school year with one parent and vacation months with the
other;
2) short-term block time, with children spending alternate weeks, months or
days with each parent or splitting weeks or days with the parents;
3) bird's nest, where children stay in the same home and the parents move
in and out for various time periods; and
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will share both physical and legal custody of the children.98 When
parents share legal custody of the child "decision-making with
regard to major facets of the child's life is shared by thejoint custodi-
ans. This means that both parents decide major issues concerning the
child's future such as education, major health care and religion."99
Joint custody awards, however, can lead to judicial infringement
on the rights of the custodial parent. For example, a Florida statute
authorizes courts to divide parental responsibility among the parties
to promote the child's best interests. I00 Although the statute does
not expressly refer to religion,101 the court in Vazquez v. Vazquez 102
used it to carve out a spiritual custody award. 10 3 The court held that
the statute's presumption in favor of joint custody authorized it to
4) free access, with the children free to move from one parental home to the
other at will.
I. ELLMAN, P. KURTZ & A. STANTON, supra note 74, at 540 (emphasis in original).
98 See supra note 66 and accompanying text for discussion of the distinction
between physical and legal custody.
99 I. ELLMAN, P. KURTZ & A. STANTON, supra note 74, at 541 (emphasis in
original).
100 FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)(2) (Supp. 1988) reads in part: "The Court shall
order that the parental responsibility for a minor child be shared by both parents
unless the court finds that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the
child." The statute further states:
a. In ordering shared parental responsibility, the court may consider the
expressed desires of the parents and may grant to one party the
ultimate responsibility over specific aspects of the child's welfare or may
divide those responsibilities between the parties based on the best interests of the
child. Areas of responsibility may include primary residence, education,
medical and dental care, and any other responsibilities which the court
finds unique to a particular family.
b. The court shall order "sole parental responsibility, with or without
visitation rights, to the other parent when it is in the best interests of"
the minor child.
Id. at § 61.13(2)(b)(2)(a)-(b) (emphasis added).
Florida offers one of the most presumptuous joint custody statutes. This statute
presumes that joint custody may perhaps be in the child's best interests even if the
parents do not consent to such an agreement and gives the judge a wide range of
discretion in structuring an award. A challenger to such ajudicial award must meet a
heavy burden of proof.
Other states have codified the joint custody concept with varying degrees ofjudi-
cial presumption. They have generally supplemented the best interests rule.
Although some state statutes grant judges discretionary authority to hold that joint
custody awards are in a child's best interests, most commonly allow such awards only
if the parents agree to them, in the belief that parental cooperation is critical for
these situations to work. Florida is not the only state, however, that does not require
parental agreement. See I. ELLMAN, P. KuRTz & A. STANTON, supra note 74, at 555-59.
101 See FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)(2)(a) (Supp. 1988).
102 443 So. 2d 313 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
103 See id. at 314.
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determine that despite the objections of their custodial Baptist
mother, the best interests of the children (including a daughter
about to enter the first grade) would be served if they were given a
Catholic education.' 4 When courts utilize the flexibility afforded by
the best interests standard in such a manner, their actions must be
carefully evaluated to ensure that they are not infinging upon a par-
ent's first amendment rights.
III. SPIRITUAL CUSTODY AND THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
A. Standard of Review
Although historically spiritual custody awards have not been
common, the nebulous nature of the best interests test combined
with the increasing rates of divorce, interfaith marriage, and societal
changes discussed above suggest that the incidence of such awards
could increase in the near future. When examining the free exercise
implications of these awards, strict scrutiny must be applied as spiri-
tual custody awards place a direct burden on the custodial parents
right to exercise her religious beliefs.' 5 In the Simms case, the custo-
dial parent was found to be in contempt of court and received a sus-
pended jail sentence because she practiced her religion at home and
brought her two young daughters with her to a Catholic church.1
0 6
It is difficult to imagine a more direct governmental restriction on an
individual's right to freedom of religious exercise. In order to satisfy
the requirements of strict scrutiny review, it is important to probe
the underlying objectives of the best interests standard. This makes
it possible to determine the extent to which the best interests stan-
dard can be used to justify the free exercise restrictions that accom-
pany a spiritual custody award. By recognizing the underlying goals,
it is possible to identify specific goals that are consistent with the
types of state interests that courts have found compelling.
B. Are The Child's Best Interests Compelling?
The best interests of the child standard is vague and undefina-
ble. The test is purposefully broad in order to avoid judicial inflexi-
bility in a complex area. However, "the so-called test is so broad as
to offer no sure guide to many if not most decisions unless it is bro-
104 Id.
105 See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
106 See Struggle For Custody, supra note 2, at A48, col. 4.
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ken down into component parts." ' 7 Therefore, to allow the best
interests standard to rise to the level of compelling, one must deter-
mine precisely what the court is attempting to accomplish by using it.
Although the test itself is undefinable, it is possible to ascertain its
goals.
As previously discussed, the justification for state intervention in
normally protected family zones lies in the breakdown of the family
unit.10 8 As one commentator has noted, "[c]hild placement laws are
society's response to the 'success' or 'failure' of a family in providing
its children with an environment which adequately serves their
needs."' 0 9 Courts use the best interests standard in an effort to
restore normalcy to the environment of a child whose family life has
become unsettled as a result of a divorce. Thus, in seeking to
protect:
the welfare of minor children as it is affected by the dissolution of
their parents' civil marriage union[, t]he care and protection of
[the] children [becomes] a matter of utmost state concern ....
Those best interests include inherent rights to proper and neces-
sary support and custody and general well-being, and are matters
to which the court's protective function most vitally applies.
110
This need to provide protection and support for a child whose
home has been destroyed by divorce is the compelling state interest
which initially allows courts to infringe upon ordinarily protected
constitutional rights under the best interests standard. The authors
of Beyond the Best Interests of the Child"' argue that current judicial
practices and standards in the custody area are inadequate, as they
tend to "run contrary to the often professed purpose of the decisions
themselves-to serve the best interests of the child."" ' 2 The authors
conclude that in order to satisfy the asserted goal of making the
child's interest supreme, we must attain the underlying objective of
restoring a normal home environment for the child." 3 This requires
107 H. FOSTER, JR., D. FREED & M. PLOSCOWE, FAMILY LAW 899 (2d ed. 1972).
108 See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
109 J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 75, at 3-4.
110 Fisher v. Fisher, 118 Mich. App. 227, 232, 324 N.W.2d 582, 584 (1982).
111 J.'GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 75.
112 Id- at 7.
113 See generally id. at 49-53 (discussing the need to advance a child's interests by
providing her with a continuous psychological parent). The authors argue that:
our capacity to predict is limited. No one . .. can forecast just what
experiences, what events, what changes a child, or for that matter his adult
custodian, will actually encounter. Nor can anyone predict in detail how
the unfolding development of a child and his family will be reflected in the
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"continuity of relationships.""' 4 In order to ensure continuity, cus-
tody decisions normally should not contain any contingencies. Cus-
tody decisions which require "continuing jurisdiction by the court
... such as a requirement to send a child to religious school ...
prompt[ ] interruption by disappointed parties who claim violation
[of the custodial parent's obligation to abide by the condition].""' 5
Thus, in order to satisfy the state's compelling interest in helping the
child regain a normal lifestyle "[o]nce it is determined who will be
the custodial parent, it is that parent, not the court, who must decide
under what conditions ... she wishes to raise the child."'16
The authors of Beyond The Best Interests of the Child, by combining
psychoanalytic and legal theory, help identify the goals underlying
the best interests standard. Specifying the objectives helps identify
state interests that are sufficiently narrow to be characterized as com-
pelling without running afoul of the standards set by the Supreme
Court. This helps to clarify the vague judicial doctrine which has
surrounded child custody decisions.
The destruction of a home brings the state into a normally pro-
tected family zone. Once this occurs, the state has two specific inter-
ests in the restoration of a stable home for the child: providing the
child with caretakers and fostering a sense of stability. The two part
analysis set forth below emphasizes these specific state objectives
and should be employed when examining the impact of a court's cus-
tody award on the constitutional rights of the child's parents.
The first step of the analysis recognizes that it is necessary for
the state to enter a family's life and find a home for the child follow-
ing a divorce. In order to promote day to day stability, the parent
who receives primary physical custody must presumptively have the
right to make daily decisions regarding the child, unfettered by court
intervention. These may include exposing the child to the custodial
parent's religion. At this point, any infringement on the rights of a
noncustodial parent does not constitute a free exercise violation in
long run in the child's personality and character formation. Thus the law
... [should not try] to do the impossible-guess the future and impose on
the custodian special conditions for the child's care .... In the long run,
the child's chances will be better if the law is less pretentious and
ambitious in its aim, that is, if it confines itself to the avoidance of harm
and acts in accord with a few, even if modest, generally applicable short-
term predictions.
Id. at 51-52 (footnotes omitted).
114 Id. at 31.
11" Id. at 37.
116 Id. at 38.
SPIRITUAL CUSTODY A WARDS
that the state action supporting the custodial parent in her choice
satisfies the strict scrutiny test.' 17 The circumstances surrounding a
divorce and the underlying psychological basis for the best interests
standard create conditions which make the state's interest in finding
a stable home for the child compelling. Unlike the amorphous crite-
rion of the best interests standard, the need to provide the child with
a home and a sense of continuity is specific and is consistent with
other types of state interests that the Supreme Court has categorized
as compelling. Specifically, this need is consistent in that it: a) pro-
motes the public health'; b) protects state citizens from physical
harm; and c) prevents moral depravity." 9 Once the home is found
for the child, however, this compelling state interest is satisfied and
parental autonomy within the home must be restored. If the state
then wishes to justify infringement upon the custodial parent's pro-
tected constitutional free exercise right via a spiritual custody award,
a second and separate constitutional analysis must be performed. 2
117 An argument may also be made that the infringement of the noncustodial
parent's right is only incidental. The court is not directly restricting the noncustodial
parent's free exercise rights. Instead, circumstances that accompany the placement of
the child with the custodial parent mean that the child might be brought up in a
religion that runs counter to the noncustodial parent's beliefs. Under the analysis set
forth in Lyng v. N.W. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988), it
becomes difficult for the noncustodial parent to successfully assert a free exercise
violation. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
118 Public health is provided by ensuring that there are caretakers for those who
are incapable of caring for themselves.
119 Children who are not provided with a home could fall victim to a variety of
morally depraved individuals and circumstances.
120 Although most courts have been able to justify almost any decision under
the broad best interests blanket, at least one court has alluded to a two step analysis
in determining the constitutionality of religious limitations when applied to a child
custody situation. In Fisher v. Fisher, 118 Mich. App. 227, 324 N.W.2d 582 (1982), a
court faced with a noncustodial father's demand that his children receive "Bible-
based" "Christian education and training," id. at 231, 324 N.W.2d at 584, recognized
the competing interests of first amendment protections and the state's interest in
promoting the best interests of the child. The court recognized that "[w]hen state
action results in a denial of one's legitimate exercise of religious freedom, the state
must show an overriding interest of the highest order to justify the action." Id. at
231, 324 N.W.2d at 584 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). It held that
"'[a] state's interest is compelling when the end that it achieves is so vital to society
that its essentiality overrides the loss of the protected religious right.' " Id. at 231,
324 N.W.2d at 584 (quoting M.I. v. A.I., 107 Misc. 2d 663, 667, 435 N.Y.S.2d 928,
931 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1981)). The court went on to employ a "constitutional balancing
test to determine if there is a compelling state interest to which defendant's full
exercise of his religious convictions may be subordinated." Id. at 232, 324 N.W.2d at
584. The court acknowledged that "[ilt is difficult to conceive of a more compelling
or vital state interest than the welfare of minor children as it is affected by the
dissolution of their parents' civil marriage union." Id. While the court utilized
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In order to justify a restriction on the custodial parent's free
exercise rights, the party seeking the infringement must demonstrate
a separate and specific compelling end and show that the means
selected are the least intrusive way of satisfying it. When a parent's
religious beliefs pose a threat of physical harm to her child, courts
have been willing to exercise their broad discretionary powers to
promote the child's best interests.21 This is consistent with other
Supreme Court decisions that support the state's compelling interest
in protecting its citizens from physical harm.' 22 As a result, little
controversy attaches to state court orders limiting the rights of a cus-
todial parent whose religious beliefs threaten the child with physical
harm. 2 ' A more vexing problem arises when a court's intrusion into
traditional doctrine in stating that the "controlling consideration in such disputes
shall be the best interests of the children," it also identified the underlying goals of
"the care and protection of children [as a] matter of utmost state concern." Id. The
court then in effect performed a two part analysis. It first determined that the best
way to satisfy the compelling end of providing care and protection of the children
was to give physical custody to the mother. Once this compelling state interest was
satisfied, the court determined that another compelling interest would have to be
shown to justify further infringement. The court held "[o]nce the purely secular
decision of custody is made, the court may not interfere with the religious practices
of either the custodial or noncustodial parent unless... those practices threaten the
children's well being." Id. at 234, 324 N.W.2d at 585 (emphasis added).
121 See e.g., Stapley v. Stapley, 15 Ariz. App. 64, 67, 70-71, 485 P.2d 1181, 1184,
1187-88 (1971) (holding that a Jehovah's Witness mother may lose custody of her
children partly based on her refusal to abide by court order regarding potential
blood transfusions and her violation of a statute prohibiting the taking of children
out on door-to-door religious solicitations); Levitsky v. Levitsky, 231 Md. 388, 398,
190 A.2d 621, 626 (1963) ("Where... there is a serious danger to the life or health
of a child as a result of the religious views of a parent .... this may bar custody by the
parent holding such views, or may call for protection against such views by an
appropriate order.").
122 See supra notes 50, 52, 53, 56, 57 and accompanying text.
123 Controversy does exist regarding the burden of proof which the contesting
party must bear. Courts are divided on the question whether the standard should be
a showing of actual harm, a substantial likelihood of harm, or merely a reasonable
probability of harm. See In re Marriage Of Mentry, 142 Cal. App. 3d 260, 269, 190
Cal. Rptr. 843, 850 (1983) (stating that "the decision to intervene must . . . be
conditioned upon a clear affirmative showing of harm or likely harm to the child");
Felton v. Felton, 383 Mass. 232, 233-34, 418 N.E.2d 606, 607 (1981) ("harm to the
child from conflicting religious instructions or practices . . . should not be simply
assumed or surmised; it must be demonstrated in detail"); Short v. Short, 698 P.2d
1310, 1313 (Colo. 1985) ("[E]vidence of a party's religious beliefs is relevant and
admissable in a custody proceeding if it is shown that such beliefs or practices are
reasonably likely to cause present or future harm to the physical or mental
development of the child.").
This Comment takes the position that the strict scrutiny standard used by the
Supreme Court in free exercise cases demands a showing of actual harm or a
substantial likelihood thereof. One set of commentators has argued a similar
position, noting that:
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the custodial parent's free exercise zone is justified by an allegedly
"compelling" state interest in promoting the child's best interests on
the basis of speculative psychological or emotional harm.' 24 One
commentator has noted that "[i]n custody disputes, a trial court is
dealing in the nether world of 'the best interests of the child,' where
judicial techniques are most suspect for their inability to project
accurately the impact of subtle environmental factors on the emo-
tional health of human beings.
'"125
When a court bases its decision on such a broad and undefinable
category, it fails to fulfill the requirements necessary to categorize
the state objective as compelling. 26 The question of religious
upbringing is very different from the need'to find a home for the
child or protect the child from harm. Those latter needs would be
characterized as compelling state interests even if the parents had
"inquiry into a parent's religious attitudes is constitutionally permissible
... when the exercise of the parent's religion poses a threat of actual harm
to the child. Because such inquiry risks infringing upon the parent's first
amendment free exercise clause right, courts should find substantial
evidence indicating that the parent's religious practices are currently
resulting in or will imminently result in detriment to the child's mental or
physical well being .. "
Developments in the Law, supra note 70, at 1339-40 (footnotes omitted).
124 In a number of cases courts have held that it would be in the best interests of
the children to be raised in the religion of the noncustodial parent without giving any
reasons more precise than the fact that the children, ranging from ages four through
twelve, had previously received limited amounts of exposure to the noncustodial
parent's religion and that to permit a change might be disruptive to the child. See
Simms v. Simms, No. 87DR3301, transcript at 9-11, 17 (Dist. Ct. Denver County,
Colo. Dec. 29, 1987); Vazquez v. Vazquez, 443 So. 2d, 313, 314 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983); Stern v. Stern, 40 Ill. App. 2d 374, 377-78, 382-83, 188 N.E.2d 97, 98, 100-
101 (1963); Gottlieb v. Gottlieb, 31 111. App. 2d 120, 123-27, 136-37, 175 N.E.2d
619, 621-22, 627 (1961); see also Spring v. Glawon, 89 A.D.2d 980, 980-81, 454
N.Y.S.2d 140, 141-42 (1982) (holding that where parties agreed prior to divorce that
the express permission of both parties would be required before commencing a
religious upbringing of child, court would enforce this against custodial parent);
Perlstein v. Perlstein, 76 A.D.2d 49, 56, 429 N.Y.S. 2d 896, 901, (1980) (holding that
where divorcing parties have agreed that a child shall be raised in a particular
religious tradition, the custodial parent has the burden of showing that the guidelines
are detrimental to the child to justify not following them); Gluckstern v. Gluckstern,
31 Misc. 2d 58, 60, 220 N.Y.S.2d 623, 624 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961) (holding that a
mother who 'tried to violate divorce agreement by thwarting the father's efforts to
raise their child in the Orthodox Jewish faith was in contempt of court).
A problem arises in these situations as in general it is unlikely that children of
such young ages could be deemed to have developed true religious needs. See infra
notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
125 Strickman, supra note 66, at 333.
126 See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text (describing characteristics
common to state interests which courts have identified as compelling).
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not been divorced. In contrast, absent a showing that the parents
religious beliefs may lead to abandonment of a child or demonstra-
ble harm, a court would never consider intervening in even the most
heated dispute between married parents regarding the religion they
choose for their child. This is even more true if the demand by one
party for such an infringement is based solely upon opinions as to
which religion will be more psychologically beneficial for the child.
Such decisions are made in the privacy of the home. "Proposed
interventions in the privacy of the family that would not conceivably
be entertained by the courts during marriage ... are not suddenly
tenable simply because the parents have become separated or
divorced."' 2 7 "No end of difficulties would arise should judges try
to tell parents how to bring up their children."' 2 8 Judicial projec-
tions of psychological harm fail to rise to the level of compelling:
[p]recisely because a court cannot know one way or another, with
any degree of certainty, the proper or sure road to personal secur-
ity and happiness .... [As a result,] a valuation of religious teach-
ing and training and its projected as distinguished from immediate
effect.., upon the physical, mental, and emotional well being of a
child, must be forcibly kept from judicial determinations .... If a
court has the right to weigh the religious beliefs or lack of them of
one parent against those of the other, for the purpose of making a
precise conclusion as to which one is for the best interests of the
child, we open a Pandora's box which can never be closed.
1 29
Some courts thus have recognized that there should be a "salutary
judicial disinclination to interfere with family privacy without [a sepa-
rate and specific showing of] a compelling need."' 30 Courts recog-
nizing that "there is no magic in phrase[s like] 'welfare of the
child' "'' have argued that "the attainment of that object requires
the observance of principles considerably more practical and less
nebulous than a mere declaration of beneficent purpose."' 3 2 Courts
that justify infringement upon the free exercise rights of custodial
127 In re Marriage Of Mentry, 142 Cal. App. 3d 260, 268, 190 Cal. Rptr. 843,
849 (1983).
128 Schwarzman v. Schwarzman, 88 Misc. 2d 866, 873, 388 N.Y.S.2d 993, 998
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (quoting People ex rel. Sisson v. Sisson, 271 N.Y. 285, 287, 2
N.E.2d 660, 661 (N.Y. 1936).
129 Zucco v. Garrett, 150 Ill. App. 3d 146, 155, 501 N.E.2d 875, 880-81 (1986)
(quoting Quiner v. Quiner, 59 Cal. Rptr. 503, 516-17 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967)) (emphasis
in original).
130 Marriage of Mentry, at 266, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
131 Jenks v. Jenks, 385 S.W.2d 370, 37.7 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
132 Id.
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parents based purely upon evidence of speculative psychological
harm fail to satisfy the compelling needs test.
1 33
There may be occasions where parties can demonstrate that
there is a psychological basis for an action that does infringe upon
the free exercise rights of the custodial parent. If the noncustodial
parent can demonstrate specific factors that pose a danger to either
the public health or morality,13 4 the compelling state interest
requirement could be satisfied. A showing of a specific psychological
need on the part of the child for the custodial parent's religion could
qualify as such a compelling state interest. One example might be if
the child herself demonstrated that she had already developed actual
religious needs.' 35 In such a case, the child would have to be of suffi-
cient maturity to comprehend the significance of the choice. The
problem for the court becomes one of line-drawing in determining
when an individual child possesses the ability to make a reasoned
choice of this nature.' 36 Another example is when a parent demon-
strates that a specific psychological problem may be associated with
133 Numerous courts have held that speculative psychological harm is an
insufficient basis for limiting the free exercise rights of a noncustodial parent. These
courts have held that a noncustodial parent has the right to expose her child to her
religion absent a specific clear and affirmative showing of demonstrable harm.
Absent such a showing, the party seeking the limitation fails to demonstrate a
sufficiently compelling state interest to justify interference with the free exercise
rights of a noncustodial parent. See, e.g., Felton v. Felton, 383 Mass. 232, 233, 418
N.E.2d 606, 607 (1981); Compton v. Gilmore, 98 Idaho 190, 192, 560 P.2d 861, 863
(1977); Robertson v. Robertson, 19 Wash. App. 425, 427-28, 575 P.2d 1092, 1093
(1978). When one considers the logic and goals underlying the best interests
standard, seesupra notes 116-24 and accompanying text, the state's interest in limiting
the rights of the custodial parent is even less compelling when based solely upon
speculation regarding potential emotional harm.
134 See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text. The state's interest in
protecting the overall health of its citizenry is enhanced when it promotes a mentally
healthy populace. Specific problems must be identified, however, when such an
objective is subjected to a strict scrutiny test.
135 See Note, supra note 15, at 1727-32 (arguing that a court may consider the
religious preferences of a mature child in a custody decision without violating the
establishment clause); see also Note, supra note 71, at 171 ("Once a child is old enough
to form some reasoned judgment regarding his parents' creeds, most courts take the
child's judgment into consideration in awarding custody." (footnote omitted)).
136 In Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233 (Alaska 1979), the Alaska Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of a statute stating that to determine the best
interests of the child for custody purposes "the court shall consider... the physical,
emotional, mental, religious and social needs of the child." Id. at 1236 (quoting
ALAsKA STAT. § 09.55.205, subsequently renumbered to ALAsKA STAT. § 25.24.150
(1980)) (emphasis added). The court held that it was constitutional "for a court to
take account of the actual religious needs of a child in awarding custody." Id. at
1239. The court "stress[ed], however, that a court must make a finding that the child
has actual, not presumed, religious needs .... By actual religious needs, we refer to
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the custodial parent's choice of religion.' 37 If, in this case, there
were factors that prevented the noncustodial parent from.caring for
the child on a full time basis, a judicial decree limiting the free exer-
cise rights of the custodial parent may prove to be the "least intru-
sive means" of satisfying the compelling state ends. Only in these
limited situations may a spiritual custody award be granted without
violating the free exercise protections established by the
Constitution.
CONCLUSION
Spiritual custody awards have a direct impact upon the most sac-
rosanct of personal and legal values. Although such awards have
been uncommon in the past, the increasing incidence of divorce and
interfaith marriages will undoubtedly bring this issue before the
courts on a more routine basis in the future. While the traditional
doctrine employed in settling child custody issues, the best interests
of the child standard, offers a sound and admirable objective, its
broad and indeterminate nature leaves open the possibility of unwise
and unconstitutional abuses ofjudicial discretion in the spiritual cus-
tody realm. If courts wish to consider such awards without improp-
erly infringing upon the free exercise rights of custodial parents,
the expressed preference of a child mature enough to make a choice between a form
of religion or the lack of it." Id. at 1239-40.
The court noted the difficulty of determining when a minor is sufficiently mature
to form such a preference. While allowing that this "will ... vary from case to case
and will not always correspond to the minor's chronological age," the court stated a
"belie[f] that, under ordinary circumstances, an average fifteen year old will be of
sufficient intellectual and emotional development to warrant a court in giving serious
consideration to the child's expressed needs with respect to religion." Id. at 1240
n.14. The court further stated that:
before [a child] can properly be classified as having religious needs, the
child must be of sufficient age to have developed some understanding of
religion and its place in his or her life. We note favorably.., one court's
holding that children aged three, five, and seven are not of sufficient
maturity to form an intelligent opinion on so complex a subject as religion
or their needs with respect to it.
Id. at 1240 n.14 (referring to Wojnarowicz v. Wojnarowicz, 48 N.J. Super. 349, 137
A.2d 618 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1958)).
137 In Funk v. Ossman, 150 Ariz. 578, 724 P.2d 1247 (1986), the anxiety of a
child, whose divorced Jewish father and Lutheran Mother were battling over his
religious training, "manifested itself in a psychosomatic problem, soiling his pants
(encopresis)." Id. at 582, 724 P.2d at 1251. Such a demonstrable detrimental effect
on the child is more precise than a general claim that a child would be
psychologically harmed and thus provides a better basis for classification as a
compelling interest.
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they must recognize the underlying goals of the best interests stan-
dard and employ a two-step analysis.
The need to find a home for a child whose life has been ravaged
by divorce constitutes a compelling state interest that is consistent
with Supreme Court standards for subrogating a parent's free exer-
cise rights. Once a suitable home is found for the child, however, a
separate analysis must be employed to justify any infringement upon
the custodial parent's free exercise rights. Unless it can be shown
that the restrictions implied by a spiritual custody award are the least
intrusive means that satisfy the state's specific compelling interest in
preventing physical or actual and demonstrable psychological harm
to the child, a spiritual custody award will unconstitutionally infringe
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